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This article offers a brief sketch of some of the key concepts and dilemmas related to 
international burden-sharing. It presents the latter as a key aspect of contemporary global 
governance that nevertheless faces difficult strategic, political and ethical challenges. These 
often seem to stem from complaints about a lack of equity in burden-sharing and 
disagreements over how “equity” is to be interpreted. Contrary to this understanding, the 
article argues that the fundamental problem is rather that as long as a solution cannot be 
devised to the problems states are trying to manage in cooperation, no equitable sharing of the 
related burdens can meaningfully occur. This may be trivial to state but is acknowledged 
rarely compared to how often it might be the case. The article uses various examples to 
illustrate this, including a detailed look at international cooperation in the face of the Ebola 
epidemic and against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  
The New and the Old: A Tale of Two Eras of Burden-sharing 
It is often posited that we live in an era of burden-sharing. There certainly are problems that 
are – at times rightly, at times wrongly – defined as common challenges that may constitute 
burdens to be shared, and there are formal as well as informal frameworks of global 
governance in which some burden-sharing is occurring. 
That we may conclude this takes more explanation than what may seem required at first sight, 
given the seemingly obvious validity of conceiving of “burdens” in a broad sense, with a view 
to many different issue areas. In fact, the expression “burden-sharing” originates from a 
specific Cold War/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) context and what was 
primarily implied by it at the time was the collective defence function of the North Atlantic 
Alliance for the purposes of which comparable, in some sense proportionate, efforts were 
expected from member states already at the time of the Korean War (Thies, 2009:106-119). 
Throughout the Alliance’s history – in fact, up to this day – this was measured mostly in 
terms of countries’ defence spending in proportion to their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Zyla, 2015:8). 
The use of GDP in this way was always questionable. Nominal and purchasing-power-
adjusted GDP values produce different comparisons of individual country contributions. Per 
capita GDP values reveal different levels of welfare across countries. Moreover, the 
interpretation of the inequality of defence-spending-to-GDP ratios was never unambiguous, 
either. Some read the latter as the “exploitation” of the large by the small, having found that 
comparatively smaller members of alliances tend to spend proportionately less on defence 
(Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Critics of these views have pointed out, however, that (1) large 
members within alliances can, due to the spending disparity, establish or reinforce their 
hegemonic position vis-à-vis others and this may translate as a positive result in their security 
policy; (2) countries with significant defence industry may benefit from increased defence 
spending whereas those without it face higher expenditure purely as a cost increase; (3) 
military capabilities are mixed goods that can be consumed for private purposes as well and 
not only for the collective purposes of one’s alliance – again to the benefit of countries with 
larger militaries who can use their capabilities in ways actually indifferent to their allies 
(Sandler and Hartley, 1999:22-57; Cooper and Zycher, 1989:12-13). These are just a few of 
the objections that arose over time to the exploitation hypothesis. Moreover, as for example 
Hynek and Marton show, small alliance members often compensate for underspending on 
defence by doing more in specific missions where this is marginally more important for the 
alliance (Hynek and Marton, 2011:15-19). 
The Post-Cold War world and the inevitable re-focusing on crisis management and other 
challenges raised further fundamental questions as to the interpretation of what constitutes 
equity in burden-sharing. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, international humanitarian aid 
and development assistance appeared in calculations and the need for a multi-dimensional 
assessment of country contributions became more self-evident (Cimbala and Forster, 2005; 
Zyla, 2015:3-4 and 32-33). Some, like Mark Boyer (Boyer, 1989; 1993), have long argued in 
favour of such a perspective, for example with reference to the need (and the issue of who 
does what) for financial stability, already during the Cold War.  
An Overview of the Burden-Sharing Experience of Recent Years 
Once – as Senator Richard Lugar suggested in the context of the Balkans crises – NATO “had 
to” go out of area in order to avoid “going out of business,” the realities of the post-11 
September 2001 world dictated that its largest undertaking in this respect take place in 
Afghanistan. Force generation remained a challenge throughout, in spite of there being, in 
rhetoric, unity over the importance of this mission to the extent that some saw talk of an “elite 
consensus” across the Alliance as warranted (Kreps, 2010). In reality, governments of the day, 
especially in multi-party, proportional-representation parliamentary democracies, had to 
respond to challenges in domestic politics by their opposition related to their commitment to 
the Afghanistan mission. There was nevertheless a strikingly consistent recurrence of the 
theme of how combating global terrorism was in the interest of everyone. As Bennett, 
Lepgold and Unger’s analysis (Bennett, Lepgold and Unger, 1994) of the 1991 Gulf War 
showed two decades ago – and as, in fact, this can be directly deduced from the premises of 
the Realist theory of International Relations – when countries look to balance a threat as part 
of an alliance, it does make a difference to them to what extent they may be threatened 
compared to others. Just as Portugal was never threatened as much by the Soviet Union or 
Warsaw Pact forces as West Germany was in the Cold War, it could not plausibly be claimed 
that each and every country was really evenly threatened by al-Qaida or that consequently 
each had the same to gain from NATO’s undertaking in Afghanistan. This may explain some 
of the difficulties of burden-sharing in Afghanistan. 
As operations in Afghanistan have already begun to wind down in 2011, the turmoil of what 
was dubbed the „Arab Spring” shook the Middle East and North Africa, and with leadership 
from Britain and France and the enabling support of the United States an intervention 
occurred in the Libyan civil war. The removal of the Gaddafi regime from power was an 
undertaking formally adopted as its own by NATO, and the leaders of the coalition 
subsequently expected contributions from every member state. At the end of the day they 
were disappointed by the less than forthcoming, or in many cases actually absent, support 
from others. Perhaps it should not have come as a surprise: the case for burden-sharing here 
was considerably weaker than in Afghanistan. To avoid speaking with the wisdom of 
hindsight about the actually negative consequences of what happened: the long-term 
implications of the intervention, and the “day after” in general, were unclear at the time – and 
there was no direct threat to speak of from the perspective of those from whom a contribution 
was demanded on the occasion. This was a humanitarian intervention after all, and the 
imperative of the situation was framed as a moral choice (basically, to prevent a possible 
genocide in the town of Benghazi), and not as a question of interest. 
At the end of 2013, the Ukrainian crisis erupted, resulting in a major increase of tension in the 
NATO-Russia relationship. The question of what to do divided the Alliance but even in the 
absence of a fully consensual view of the situation, it was clear even to the more hesitant 
members that some sort of response was required after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, to 
send a signal with the aim of deterrence. By this point, the United States was paying over 75% 
of the cumulative total defence spending of NATO, and loudly and clearly raising this as a 
problem. Even if the US was not at this point using all of its defence resources in actuality for 
the Alliance’s purposes (as it never really was, at any point in history), this was a major lack 
of proportionality and clearly relevant from the point of view of equity. However, it also 
transpired in the light of the crisis – as well as on the basis of the lessons of the Libya 
intervention where European coalition participants were in short time running low on 
precision-guided bombs – that complaints about quantitative issues may be less relevant when 
even the modernisation of European militaries became largely impossible under the weight of 
continuing defence spending cuts. It is certainly relevant from a strategic perspective that the 
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics may have been supplied more tanks by now than 
the number of tanks Germany and France have. It is, however, even more worrying, with 
regards to the future, that there is a lack of willingness in Europe to plan militarily for the 
general possibility of major future armed conflict. For now, the credibility of the NATO 
response came to a signficant extent from the United States’ willingness to reassure European 
allies on the Alliance’s eastern periphery. 
If we take a look at (1) the number of participating countries, (2) the ratio of resources-
committed/spent to resource-demand, (3) the statistical distribution of individual country 
contributions, and (4) the dominant framework of interpretation as key variables in the 
background of these and similar collective efforts, measuring the success of mobilisation for 
burden-sharing, Libya is clearly the most negative example. There, as conditions proved less 
than ideal, the outside world quickly lost interest in making a significant investment in 
improving the situation. In Afghanistan’s case the jury is still out, although most observers 
agree that sufficient force was never generated throughout the mission and that consequently 
it is no wonder that the present situation is at best an uneasy stalemate with Islamist 
insurgents. As much as it has been tested so far, the NATO response to the Ukrainian crisis 
has worked the most convincingly, albeit with a broad distribution of contributions from 
different NATO member countries and (as the aim is deterrence) against a hypothetical 
challenge, with the limited aims of reassurance. 
This finding may seem counter-intuitive if one thinks of how, out of the three cases, 
Afghanistan was almost unanimously framed as a common threat in NATO member state 
leaders’ rhetoric. A simple observation this article seeks to confirm therefore with two 
additional case studies is that the “framework of interpretation” variable may not really be key 
to determining the quality of a coalition effort – as measured by “resources-committed to 
resource-demand” and “distribution of individual country contributions.” What matters more, 
as will be shown below, is how pure (how purely public) a public good is, and, additionally, 
how purely it can be produced.  
International Cooperation in the Face of the Ebola Epidemic and the Islamic State 
The distinct specific challenges related to the Islamic State and the Ebola epidemic have both 
been framed as universally concerning by a host of heads of state and government as well as 
by representatives of international organisations. The efforts against both were consistently 
presented by almost all state and intergovernmental actors effectively as the production of 
public goods. The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa an “international public health emergency” on 8 August 2014 and received criticism 
for doing so only belatedly. As far as the Islamic State is concerned, UN Security Council 
Resolution 2170 concluded that ISIS is responsible for systematic and grave abuses of human 
rights, including crimes against humanity. Many Middle Eastern countries, among them 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have referred to ISIS as a major terrorist threat by September 2014, 
one that they thought would have implications for the rest of the world, already before the 
coming together of the US-led international coalition at the Paris conference on 15 September 
2014. 
Yet the two challenges are very different. The Ebola epidemic is in effect only an 
intercontinental flight away from the key central nodes of civic aviation now that it has, over 
the course of 2014, made its way into urban areas/larger settlements in West Africa. It thus 
concerns all the nodes of a scale-free global network through the small-world effect of 
connectivity. In this way, it indirectly threatens even the Islamic State. The latter, on the other 
hand, does not seem to threaten all corners of the globe in quite the same way. Islamic State-
inspired terrorist attacks may be a threat in a large number of countries but they are not a 
plausible threat in a similarly large number of other countries for the moment. Unlike the 
Ebola virus which is content with any human host anywhere, the Islamic State’s message 
cannot similarly effectively make its way everywhere. 
The means with which it is possible to act in the face of these challenges are also different. In 
the case of the Ebola epidemic counter-productivity is rarely an issue in the case of most 
conceivable measures (albeit some containment/quarantine measures have been criticised in 
this respect). Certainly, efforts to create a vaccine, isolating patients in Ebola Treatment Units 
(ETUs), supplying such ETUs to countries with weak public health capacities along with 
other forms of aid, or the methodical contact-tracing that is required with every new 
discovered case – such measures generally cannot plausibly backfire. Also, a country that acts 
against Ebola is typically not facing an increased threat (although health personnel working 
overseas and becoming sick is a possible vector of importing the disease in the case of 
medical evacuations). The Islamic State, on the other hand, is very responsive in its 
propaganda, and joining the coalition against it does evoke at least signals that this might 
result in an increased threat. It is also unclear if the current measures against the Islamic State 
may plausibly work: both the effectiveness of air strikes and the different armed forces and 
groups fighting the Islamic State on the ground can, and have been, questioned. 
Not only is thus the action against the Ebola epidemic a clearer case of public good 
production – it is also clearly more feasible. Joining this action poses no similar capability 
barrier as having assets useful for air strikes does in the case of combating the Islamic State. 
International law poses no barrier, either, as it does for instance in the case of bombing targets 
in Syria without unambiguous consent from the Syrian government there. 
From this it can be deduced that in reasonable hypotheses one should expect a greater number 
of participants, a better resources-committed to resource-demand ratio, smaller distribution of 
country contributions, formal institutional frameworks of cooperation, and no manipulation of 
access to the good being produced in the case of cooperation against the Ebola epidemic. 
Conforming to this one indeed finds that mobilisation was more successful in the case of the 
Ebola epidemic. According to the Ebola Funding Tracker database, as of April 2015 sixty-
eight countries have contributed some kind of assistance to fighting the spread of the disease. 
As to combating ISIS, according to a list by the Washington Post, 13 countries have expressed 
political support, 13 have provided humanitarian aid and 20 have done more than this (for 
example, they supplied military equipment to forces fighting ISIS or participated in air 
operations). The State Department has a longer list of sixty countries (plus the Arab League 
and the European Union) but clearly the majority there is not part of the military action 
against ISIS. 
The results achieved so far, inasmuch as they allow one to draw conclusions as to the 
resources-provided to resource-demand ratio, also point to the mobilisation against Ebola 
being more successful. In the case of Ebola contact-tracing has become more efficient, the 
number of available ETUs and other public health capacities grew beyond needed capacity in 
some places, and the R0 value (the average number of people infected by a single infected 
individual) has come down over time, along with the number of new cases. The epidemic has 
been contained to the three West African countries primarily affected, and of these Liberia 
already seemed to have ended its epidemic for a brief period of time earlier this year. In 
contrast with this, ISIS was able to adapt well to the military pressure applied against it and 
has not lost major territory as a result of air strikes and action on the ground. Demand has 
been more fully met in the case of Ebola in light of formal projections of anticipated needs by 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as well. In September 
2014, by which time the WHO officially deemed the crisis “an international public health 
emergency,” OCHA assessed that funding of $988 million would be needed by the UN – of 
which a sum of $378 million was committed by mid-October 2014. By November the 
required funding was re-assessed as amounting to $1.5 billion but pledges and contributions 
were growing accordingly as well. At the same time significant contributions were made 
outside the UN system, too, and the Ebola Funding Tracker listed contributions totalling 
$2.91 billion by state actors alone by April 2015. 
A simple measure of difference in terms of the distribution of country contributions may be 
that in the case of ISIS many coalition participants offered only political support which is hard 
to price in, whereas in the case of Ebola the sixty-eight countries alluded to above all pledged 
as well as provided funding or assistance of tangible value. 
As to the manipulation of access to the public good in question, in the case of Ebola it would 
be very hard to imagine how this could be done in the first place. To the contrary when it 
comes to ISIS: a crucial issue in the organisation of the fight against the Islamic State was 
how to secure the antagonistic cooperation of distinct coalitions that fear each other’s gains, 
too – not only those of ISIS. On the one hand, there is Iran, the Syrian government and 
Hezbollah (along with other, minor armed groups); and on the other there is the U.S.-led 
coalition including western countries as well as Arab countries, notably from the Gulf region. 
This explains why bilateral diplomacy, e.g. visits by General Lloyd Austin to the region on 
behalf of the Pentagon, informal deals with Saudi Arabia, or the Obama administration’s 
secretly initiated correspondence with Iran over the issue were necessary when preparing for 
operations against ISIS whereas in the fight against the Ebola epidemic multilateral 
institutional frameworks dominated, with the WHO taking the lead and others such as the 
World Bank or specific UN agencies also playing their role. Funding the campaign against 
Ebola was also organised largely through these channels, complemented by some ad hoc 
initiatives such as the London conference of 2 October 2014 at the United Kingdom’s 
initiative. But whereas the UK was a keen financer of the latter, and to some extent a leading 
country in the fight against Ebola, a coalition leader was much more clearly visible as well as 
necessary against ISIS. The United States had to fulfill this role even as a key event in 
mobilising support was seemingly the Paris conference of 15 September 2014 at French 
initiative – in fact, the latter basically only provided a multi-party seal of approval to the 
Obama administration’s strategy announced days earlier.  
Conclusions 
Given (1) that the dominant framework of interpretation (that burden-sharing is required and 
legitimate) – which was the same in both the Ebola and ISIS cases – does not effectively 
predict the quality of burden-sharing, and (2) that in the preceding overview even in a case 
where there was no consensual framework of interpretation (in the Ukraine case) it was 
possible to have a working burden-sharing arrangement, one can draw a modest conclusion: 
namely, that behind dominant frameworks of interpretation strategic narratives may matter 
more (on the topic of strategic narratives see De Graaf, Dimitriu and Ringsmose, 2015). 
There has to be agreement among burden-sharing actors not only that a certain goal is 
desirable (and that it may be called a public or common good) but also regarding the ways and 
means of achieving said end. A working strategic narrative has to offer this. It has arguably 
been missing to some extent in Afghanistan whereas in Libya it was emphasised that a moral 
choice needed to be made rather than an actual strategy found. To the contrary in the case of 
Ukraine: although NATO member states may not have agreed completely on a narrative of 
what happened in Ukraine, on what to offer to Ukraine in the long run or how much they 
could afford to sanction Russia economically, they all agreed that some kind of signal of 
military preparedness was needed exactly in order to decrease the ambiguity of the situation 
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. That this could be achieved by a comparatively minor 
build-up of forces along the Alliance’s eastern periphery was a belieavable narrative in the 
sense of its constituting a set of anticipated cause-effect mechanisms that most could trust. 
Similarly, in the case of the Ebola epidemic it was never a questionable narrative that an 
international mobilisation of resources could, with sufficient effort, achieve results, and thus 
burden-sharing worked here as well. In contrast, in the fight against the Islamic State the 
strategic narrative includes many loose threads. What happens in a country such as Iraq with 
infrastructure ruined even further by air strikes – is it going to offer the prospect of a land free 
of violent radicalism of the jihadi variety? Does the killing, apparently at a rather slow pace, 
of Islamic State combatants result in incapacitating the organisation? What happens if that is 
not the case? And, given continued successful recruitment by ISIS, are Syria and Iraq as 
battlespaces net killers or breeders of jihadi combatants – for example from the perspective of 
European countries? 
To some extent these findings contradict Mancur Olson’s expectation that collective action 
may fail with greater likelihood if the good to be produced is a true public good – as is the 
case with fighting Ebola (Olson, 1975:14-16). Olson convincingly concludes this alluding to 
how it may be in no one’s interest to act when anyone and everyone may be expected to act. It 
is not difficult, however, to offer a plausible explanation of the findings here with reference to 
strategic narratives – one that may function as a caveat to Olson’s proposition. When 
something can be realistically done and inaction carries significant risk that is more or less 
evenly distributed, collective action is more likely than in cases where risk is uneven and the 
good to be produced is either not purely a public good or it cannot be produced purely – that 
is, without the possible production of some public as well as private “bads.”  
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